“following on from io - nate introspection response”

a draft analysis of Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?”

“which is generally considered one of the most important on this topic” — Nate

1

sentiments and straw men

io - thomas nagel - sentiments and straw men

I’m disappointed – (not that Nagel shared these thoughts before I was born) – but that these talking points are still considered to be so important 2.

Nagel sets out his position early:

“consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong” — Nagel

“philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations of what is incomprehensible, in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different” — Nagel

“it seems hopeless” — Nagel

The remainder of Nagel’s discussion rides this perverse sense of futility and apathy down; though I note, that I generally agree with the phenomenal space Nagel points to in his caveats, but not always his assessment of that space – “perhaps a new theoretical form can be derived for the purpose, but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future” (farkin’ ’ell mate. What Nagel is describing here, is a consequence of insufficiently unsentimentally re-evaluating fundamental priors of formal education. Once formally conditioned to think in a certain fundamental ways, it is very difficult to perceive alternatives)

“aside: i think what it is I’m disappointed about, is the apparent failure of sufficient individuals within the endeavour to organise around the idea of ‘a fresh look at the space’

Aside from the dogmatic traditions, I can’t think of another space where this failure to adapt could go on so long without correction. The unwavering conclusion that – ‘if we can’t figure this out now, it must be really intractable’; and not – ’er, perhaps lets see about a different approach’ (implicit, redefine the problem space, because simply iterating approaches within the same problem space, is absolutely not equivalent (and demonstrates lack of contextual awareness, or a failure of imagination)”

Following, Nagel’s arguments appear to suffer a blinkered view of the problem space; and perhaps, are shaped by conflating ‘reduction as it is today’ with ’the space of possible reduction’ – or the map Nagel is familiar with, for the territory, and the space of possible future maps.

“Any reductionist program has to to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced” — Nagel

Then call the method something else, and focus on the identification of constituent phenomena, and build up, such that the eventual outcome is then able to be reduced, to newly identified phenomena (surely this is the case at some point? Material foundations were already fairly well defined, the rest is identification of relative intermediate level?)

“If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed” — Nagel

More is different – all phenomena are ‘constituents + compositional delta’ 3. One (absolutely) valid problem to pose – ‘how might compositional delta to established priors result in what we call consciousness’, but long before that, we ought to be able to align constituent phenomena with physical foundations, and downstream consequences (see the map for the an introduction for visual intuitions)

To make the point: one does not write the reverse-engineered specification (outcome) until after one has reverse-engineered; which initially involves focus on constituents in isolation, to known primitives, then aligned, then overall specification finalised.

“it is useless to base the defence of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. for there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness” — Nagel

4 Even within the perspective Nagel later demonstrates, the mystery of consciousness can only be some delta to ‘material formations across levels’, else we invoke magic (gist #1)

By incrementally increasing the number of constituent phenomena materially accounted for, we incrementally decrease ‘what it is that we need an account of consciousness to explain’

We don’t need to to explain basic concerns of biology, nor chemistry, nor physics – take that as a start point. The question then, is defined by ‘what is left to explain having ignored the distraction of consciousness, and built up, and aligned across’ – the very opposite of Nagel’s assertions.

This is the essence of what I refer to as ‘fractional accounting’. When all phenomena are composition, and more is different, the only way to isolate the unique delta of each composition, is to first incrementally account for constituent phenomena (or fractions of the whole)

“we work towards completeness – we don’t give up because we cannot define completeness before we start”

Nagel’s perspective and thinking (and the endeavour, to be fair) appears to suffer the baggage of earlier times – “we’re so special, are you really suggesting that we ought to be able to solve this problem by equating ourselves to lesser forms?!”

For some reason, Nagel’s top-down framing of perspective seems blind to phenomenal constituents; or unwilling to acknowledge that constituents implicated in our perspective can possibly be the same as those of others – perspectives too are composition, of constituents, so arranged

An important shift occurs when considering evolutionary phenomenal change from the bottom-up (as opposed to top-down) – the question of “how do you prove that isolated phenomena are the same?” is replace by “what grounds do you have for suggesting that constituent phenomena (which align across contexts) are different?”

subject object

io - thomas nagel - subject object

reduction, reductionism, supervenience, levels, entailment

#tbc

the martian

io - thomas nagel - the martian

appendix

follow up toots

toot 1

link

I’m surprised you had such a negative reaction to Nagel! I guess in part it’s because you’re concerned with different things. He’s pointing out that subjective experience is fundamentally different stuff than matter. There simply is no physical theory for what subjective experience is, and without that it’s impossible to argue how it might come about from certain configurations of atoms. It sounds like you’re more concerned about what sort of mental mechanisms we have evolved, and how they shape the kind of conscious experience we have. You aren’t so concerned with why we “feel” our minds instead of just “computing” them. Is that fair to say? I’m sympathetic to that stance. Perhaps Nagel is right that the “hard problem” isn’t something physics can explain, in which case it just becomes an axiom: in this universe, some patterns of matter have subjective experience. That’s just how it is. It doesn’t stop us from exploring the origins and properties of various conscious systems. — Nate

Oh, I’m very much concerned with Nagel’s concerns!

Though I agree, certainly the disciplinarily-isolated-physics-of-today will not explain the hard problem. Present isolated maps are not sufficiently continueable (though they ought to be, at which point unified scientists will reconcile consciousness with an account grounded through the concerns of physics)

Over the course of this thread I will sketch an outline for a physically aligned theory for subjective experience (physically, behaviourally, and all the others), and I’ll be very interested to learn of any counterpoints which fall outside of the definition!

consider consciousness as a concert

“what is the hard problem of consciousness (of isolated sciences), if not a failure to consider that the concert is a composition of the concerns of other disciplines?”

Nagel’s perspective (and that of the present endeavour, and perhaps others, as a result), appears to stall at the ‘dynamic range, layered textures, of the composition of experience’, like overwhelm of a orchestra in concert, for a listener with insufficient prior knowledge of individual instruments.

It is possible to familiarise oneself with instruments in isolation, and later, identify individual instrumentation from complex layered symphonic concert. Further, once we’ve isolated primitives, and unusual things like harmonics, filtering, beating, the haas effect, and relative difference in the way we perceive and interpret percussion, bass, and strings 5, the material problem-space is no longer the same. The problem-space ought only be concerned only with relation between known constituents 6.

Conscious experience too.

My position, is that “what it is which must be explained by the hard problem”, becomes increasingly small, to elementary, given the right approach and preparation 7.

toot 2

link

I like the idea of trying to eliminate concerns of biology, chemistry, and physics from the study of intelligent phenomena. I think this works because of a kind of encapsulation, which your diagram “the map” seems to hint at. Life uses constraints to generate platforms for higher level development. Like in a software stack, these layers are designed very specifically to hide lower-level details and make them irrelevant to the functioning of higher-level systems. For instance, the cell has a language for describing complex proteins, and a whole suite of utilities that can be invoked by just synthesizing the right protein trigger. The DNA program works entirely in this symbolic space of codons and gene regulators without knowing anything about chemistry. The cell takes care of that part.

Ok…

I know that you use terms like designed to refer to mechanisms as simple as those found in individual cells as part of the narrative that past cells design future cells (and I also perceive morphisms across phenomenal scopes, aka levels, incl. Through time); and with these tools of though, we speak of interrogating intelligence (across different scopes) by separation of concerns – and as such, the low hanging fruit, as it were, are fundamental constituents of specific structure and behaviour (a formal account of metaphors, if you will)

I agree that our definition for intelligence will accrue from these fundamental (structural and behavioural) morphisms – further, each time we identify these morphisms across scopes though to cognitive and experiential mechanics, “what is is which must be explained by the hard problem” is reduced, to the intersection and relation between (the implementation of) these morphisms, rather than simply “consciousness from matter/energy”

tracing morphisms

“these layers are designed very specifically to hide lower-level details and make them irrelevant to the functioning of higher-level systems”

Lets explore this statement through chemistry, as applies to cells and human consciousness.

some background context from my thinking:

  1. all phenomenal behaviour is circumstantial
  2. i find it useful to think in terms of ’the evaluation state distinction’ – (eg. energy, matter and all subsequent phenomena are state, and are evaluated only upon intersection) 8 1. I think of evaluation as sequence in time (just like the mechanisms within cells) 2. evaluation has latency
take chemistry

Chemical reactions occur upon matter intersection, whereby state is evaluated. Change is circumstantial – which elements happen to participate; degree of intersection; etc. Maybe the result is new state, maybe the same state continues unchanged, or is influenced in some manner.

The potential for this evaluation flows from:

  1. The constituents of matter
  2. As constrained by each unique composition of matter (musical sense, incl. Structure, etc)

So the behaviour of the higher-thing is the interaction of the higher-things lower-things, though specifically:

  1. Initially only those still ’exposed’ by the structure of the higher-thing, to the intersection
    1. Whether fully (can evaluate almost as if separate, to separation, or other change or influence)
    2. Or partially – facilitates evaluation, but evaluation also includes {interrupted; shaped; influenced} other lower-things of the greater higher-thing

.

This appears to align with your statement (paraphrasing) “the cell governs which intersections are available to the DNA sequence” – DNA is one sequence, which is entirely dependent upon local circumstances which govern which intersections are possible/ occur.

Ergo, all behaviour is circumstantial.

. .

#tbc

toot 3

link

I’m really intrigued by your final points about “phenomenal constituents,” though I’m not sure I fully understand it. It makes me think of Mike Levin’s “cognition all the way down.” I think consciousness and intelligence must exist in some minimal form in every single cell, and perhaps even simpler “lifeforms.” What we think of as “true consciousness” or “true intelligence” is merely an aggregation of that simpler stuff, an elaboration of it into more complex forms. In that sense, then, I agree: we can know what it’s like to be a single cell, because our experience is made up of just that kind of experience. However, I do think the very complex structure of our bodies and brains is an obstacle. Our minds shape that primordial consciousness in a very particular way, and other creatures shape it very differently. It’s not clear how to tease apart what properties existed from the very root, and which only emerged from the particular shape our minds evolved to have.

“I think consciousness and intelligence must exist in some minimal form in every single cell” – Nate

I’ll counter with “consciousness can be described bottom-up, in generalised terms and a specific architecture (of morphisms, as above), which makes it clearer what consciousness is”

Intelligence is framed by conditional behaviour (through SOR, then async); and we can trace the origins of conditionality up through prior phenomena to a specific architectural intersection of morphisms we call consciousness. To call each instance intelligence is to invoke generalisation to morphism, though consciousness requires a specific architecture – I think you’ll need to see it before you get this point – we are working towards it. This conversation on ‘different forms which fit a pattern’ is necessary preparation 9.

And stepping back, the overall complexity of our brain is surely a distraction:

  1. A non-trivial amount of brain complexity, is integrated self-assembly and maintenance!
    1. Think of a code base (or physical machine) for self-assembling anything relative to a directly assembled thing
    2. Chemical logistics are hugely impactful to cognition (can discuss)
  2. A bunch of our brain is substrate for signal – the system is a subset (our cpu, memory and persistence are implemented in the neurones we look at). A database has structure, which isn’t the query engine, nor cursor 10
#tbc

  1. Caveat – I don’t have access to additional literature, so haven’t covered referenced material, nor subsequent conversation… ↩︎

  2. I’ll refer to the gist, in particular #2, though all apply. ↩︎

  3. I will go on to define this in detail at a later stage, but think food recipe for one basic intuition for the time being. Push back for more. ↩︎

  4. Rubbish! ↩︎

  5. That each exists within a distinct sub-space, of the space-of-all-bandwidth (of human hearing) ↩︎

  6. Which includes the implications of simultaneity, when applicable. ↩︎

  7. Initially broad strokes, and later, fine ones. ↩︎

  8. Noting that that constituents constantly evaluate among themselves, and must remain in a state of mutual equilibrium, like orbiting planets, for higher level cohesion, stability, etc. Our attentions are on the interplay across the boundary of encapsulation, between respective extrinsic and intrinsic participants, all the way through/down/etc. ↩︎

  9. Along with other points i’ve raised, including information/ map lifecycle, etc. ↩︎

  10. Aside: my money is on some circuitry within the enteric system also being essential to the final map, of the architecture of consciousness, to neurones. ↩︎