More is different.
But however we might interpret or perceive it, more is never completely different, nor absolutely different, nor infinitely different: more can only ever be relatively, finitely different. Necessarily.
Approximately all universal phenomena are composed of simpler priors; and each distinct structural phenomenal composition manifests a unique behavioural profile when participating with causal peers. A causal peer is any other phenomena which 1. Shares one or more behavioural characteristics (and ultimately ancestral constituents/ priors) and 2. Has intersected sufficiently in spacetime (is in the same time and place) for structural and behavioural evaluation to occur (because all phenomenal behaviour is evaluated upon intersection, circumstantially 1)
More is different states that the behavioural profile of composed phenomena differs from the sum of the behavioural characteristics (or profiles) of all parts: but that more is different is not magic; nor absolutely isolated; nor infinite in possibility. It is a mechanical result; inherently constrained, and relative to the nature and circumstances of constituents; and as a consequence, only ever one of a finite space of possibilities.
Physicalism and supervenience (while suffering some of each respective definition), are fundamentally aligned: more is only ever different in ways which nonetheless supervene upon constituents (commonly phenomenal priors), and recursively; down through consecutive layers of phenomenal structural composition, to physical origins. More is not magically different, but mechanically different. The foundations of mores’ difference is necessarily physical; though we perceive something quite different 2. Regardless, every more, is a new circumstance for us to abstract, and reason.
All cognition is abstract, necessarily – we perceive universal phenomena by abstraction – and it is useful, I suggest, to consider the relation between our abstractions (of how more is different, and phenomenal supervenience), through the lens of time.
Specifically, in a similar way that the sample-rate of sound recording relates to frequency, and therefore perceive the constraints placed upon the scope of more is different, and the supervened, in a similar way to musical harmonics (albeit, however inverted) not every frequency can produce any harmonic. Inversion relates to the fact sound harmonics are special cases of lower notes, whereas as phenomena composition increases in size, perceptive temporal frequency increases, such that larger compositions, and lower perceptive temporal frequencies are in effect, harmonics of simpler higher frequency priors.
Time plays a crucial role in how more is different
more is different because each distinct structural phenomenal composition is a distinct causal sequence. and as the observable scale of phenomenal composition increases, so too does the catalytic (or mechanical) lifecycle. for example: from individual chemical reactions, up through replication and biological phenomena. noting that later, larger, phenomenal catalytic (or mechanical) lifecycles take longer to complete – complete at a lower frequency – though all (downstream of physical phenomena), by supervenience, are entirely dependent upon plural higher frequency phenomena #rewrite
As such, complex phenomena are a kind of lower frequency phenomenal harmonic, and importantly, at every stage, the space-of-all possible related harmonics in any harmonic series, are necessarily finite.
More is a different fundamental, but still, only ever relatively so.
The role of science then, is to discern and isolate phenomenal fundamentals, and harmonics, by appropriate paradigmatic heuristics; though the science of the present day, with isolated disciplines, fails to sufficiently account for the necessary relationship between each, and the way in which constraints propagate throughout, to define the legal scope-of-possible at each resolution.
To view phenomena in a unified manner, as does this project, is not to dismiss individually discernible notes, but to reframe each, within a finite scope-of-possibility, defined at each fundamental and harmonic, by simpler phenomenal priors.
More is not infinitely different: but relatively and finitely different; because harmonic series are relative and finite
Given the relative, finite delta between phenomena and respective descendant harmonics, consider :
- Experience supervenes on cognitive operation
- Perception supervenes on cognitive mechanism
These are not absolute or infinite differences
Experience and perception must both result from mores’ difference, and in a simpler way than we commonly consider.
#tbc #rewrite first pass. will circle back