#rewrite ffs
What began as research into something quite specific, stumbled upon an unusual approach and method 1 which seemed to generalise well, and appeared extensible, by a kind of formal relative accumulation 2.
ok, a formal abstraction of some kind?
Sure, generalisations abstract from specific, concrete concepts – the more general, the more abstract; and at a certain point, it might feel like we’re no longer talking about things, as much as between things
this already seems complicated and vague, how does that help?
To consider phenomenal relation at the scope-of-all universal phenomena, we need to find a way of describing and thinking about phenomenal relation, which applies equally well to arbitrarily different types and kinds of phenomena.
We need a ‘phenomena invariant model’
we already have one ‘phenomena invariant model’ – the term ’thing’
Well, sure. Unfortunately as it turns out, the term thing, is not all that useful for rigorous analysis at the scope-of-all universal phenomena.
Our problem, is that while a thing may be any type or kind of phenomena, the term thing :
- Is an isolated frame of reference
- Which depends upon implicit distinctions, to exclude ‘what is not the thing’, and
- Lacks a formal means of relation to other things
a thing can be said to relate to other things, of course. but as it turns out, when the relationship between things is left ambiguous, we quickly become confused – our brains have no way to do any background heavy lifting for us 3
And of course, all of this has not gone unnoticed – but after may lifetimes worth of conversations about the simultaneous ubiquity and unsuitability of the term thing within formal discourse (with the inevitable subsequent abandonment of ’thing’, to recede back to specialised, domain-specific-terms) – what I am suggesting, is that all we was really needed, was a better ’thing’
A more formal, explicit thing, than our present-day implicit thing, thing
#tbc