unimath  ^{[active draft]  #tbc}

—so uh, you’re covering ‘quite a lot of ground’ there chap – are you sure that you’re not ‘overstretching yourself’?

right? so let’s cover some fundamental intuitions first

not polymath; unimath

hear me out

As a species, we tend to distinguish and identify phenomena by differences – the characteristic elements of each, which the other does not posses.

This is for good reason:

1. Top-down – we might observe that biology tends to optimise for frugality, but more fundamentally;
2. Bottom-up – the simplest implementation is more likely to evolve (defined in terms of minimal-viable iterations from prior)

As a consequence, when we consider two distinct domains of intellectual concern, we immediately become aware of a vast expanse of irreconcilable detail between each – and we might easily imagine how complicated the task of understanding both must be

And yes, the task of understanding ‘all of those details’, would indeed be complicated – but that isn’t what I am suggesting here – in fact, the opposite, of sorts.

1. If when considering two distinct domains of intellectual concern, we pause and instead consider all commonality between them, however tangential, we will always observe a simpler scene ¹
2. On it’s own this method is unlikely to lead to a detailed understanding of either domain, however when this method is repeated, across arbitrarily diverse scopes of phenomena, a set of common patterns of constraint, structure, and behaviour begins to emerge
3. Patterns which, over time, generalise, to a simple conclusion – all intellectual domains, however unique and complicated, reduce to a set of general forms, re-expressed throughout different contexts

that is to say, when we think in terms of phenomenal relation, rather than phenomenal distinction, our perceptive-lens shifts to noticing and defining phenomena in context, by the way in which phenomena participate causally with one another; and temporally, the circumstances in which phenomena arise (or first arose), and all of this, follows can be described by the same set of rules

so, while this project does indeed cover an unhelpful area of concern ², it does so with a finite set of rules and tools of thought, applied contextually, as necessary: so not polymath, but unimath ^{3 4}

—well, so you say – can you prove it?

Right.

• Firstly, the patterns came from analysis of the approach used to begin to reconcile ’the mind behind meditation practices’, and ’the mind behind psychiatric descriptions of (supposed) mental disorders’; two different maps of the same territory, with phenomenal commonality, yet one side desirable, and an the other ostracised. Quite an ambitious, scope of demonstration
• The scope then expanded to include all philosophical and practical approaches to understanding the mind
• Then the scope expanded to explain the mind in terms of fundamental priors
• Now the scope is expanded to predict the future scope of agi

If I am saying anything of value across these spaces, it is a success of the approach, but when all follow from the same simplified (unifying) perspective, something interesting is happening, I suggest.

—so, unimath equates to applying a unifying perspective to understandings, however isolated, because territory is continuous, and our maps ought to be continuable?

Sure. Yep, about right.

remember though: consider this all an experiment, to apply a common set of patterns – to everything everywhere, all at once – and at this point, even if the experiment is wrong, it’s an interesting wrong, at least

if you notice problems or mistakes, please let me know (contact)

#tbc