https://mastodon.online/@themanual4am/112064559119407973

conclusion: all special-intelligence extends respective/ relative general-intelligence

sister thread to: on cognition and computation

introduction

A thread on the evolution of biological intelligence.

Initial questions :

  1. —what are the evolutionary origins of biological intelligence?
  2. —what is biological intelligence?
  3. —what is neuronal intelligence?
  4. —what is non-neuronal cellular intelligence?
  5. —how might neuronal and non-neuronal intelligences relate?
  6. —what came before non-neuronal intelligence?
  7. —what might be common across all kinds of intelligence?

1/

approach

General approach: ’think/ map across traditionally isolated domains of concern'

  1. A general-form question

—what came before x, and how do we think of x in those terms?

  1. A deconstructive analytical process ‘stack analysis’

‘stack analysis’ is like phenomenal or compositional reverse-engineering (by: {supervenience; potential; propagation; inheritance; etc})

  1. Paradigm-invariant resultant state

including: general-special domain; phenomenal (compositional/ temporal) substrate; map territory; set-theoretic; category-theoretic; constraint, structure, behaviour; etc

2/

intuitions

The word intelligence will be used to describe plural, phenomenally distinct kinds of intelligence (though not absolutely distinct, but relatively distinct)

—how might we make sense of that?

  1. #Phenomenal substrate (4/)
  2. #Set-theoretic example (5/)
  3. #Relative general-domain (6/)
  4. #Representational substrate (7/)

although we are exploring technical details about nature, we’re not looking to map every technical detail at this time, but a necessary simplified abstraction of an outer boundary – very much like the difference between a software interface and one-of-any implementations

initially, the important part isn’t the minute technical detail of phenomena, but outer boundaries and interrelations thereof

consider feature detection: or ‘what is it to see past browser detection, to capability detection’ – such that we better describe phenomena by common feature rather than holistic label (and such that capabilities can be seen to be inherited, and to evolve independently)

3/

phenomenal substrate

what comes after recomposes what came before

Phenomenal substrate :

  1. Is a ‘phenomenally and temporally relative’ term
  2. Refers to the set-of-all circumstances {material; transformational sequence} necessary to construct a phenomenon
    1. Encapsulates the set-of-all {permanent; temporary} phenomenal dependencies which must {exist prior; be satisfied in-time 1} to explain the resultant structurally-composed derived form 2
  3. Defines (or instructs) a phenomena-relative incrementally-finite space-of-all possible derived forms
  4. Is a metaphor for a well-formed relative general-domain

consider the phenomenal substrate of a cathedral (or whatever!) :

  1. arches, pillars, walls, roof/ ceilings, etc
  2. blocks and bricks, timber, metalwork, glass
  3. also incidental (or temporal) substrate – like scaffolding, no longer visible, but essential to the present state of construction (and which includes prior forms of substrate composition)

—what do we miss by overlooking (persisted, temporal) phenomenal substrate?

consider: ‘more is different’

—if more is relatively (not absolutely) different, what is more relatively different from?

—what is different about a cathedral relative to it’s respective (persisted, temporal) substrate?

—how does one more-difference compare to another different more-difference?

4/

set-theoretic example

—what is intelligence?

language is ambiguous – how might we make sense of the term intelligence being used to describe distinct things?

however different distinct-kinds of intelligence are, there must be something which qualifies each for inclusion in the ‘set-of-all intelligences’ – there must be some element(s) common to each kind – and those common elements define the signature, which answers the above question

  1. Consider each kind of intelligence as a unique set of circumstances
  2. For two different kinds (of intelligence), sets must intersect, and the intersection must include what-it-is which qualifies each as ‘a kind of intelligence’
  3. —what is common across different intelligences?
    1. —how about thee different kinds? Four?
  4. The intersect between all kinds of intelligence, is necessarily simpler than any one definition
  5. Consider that what biological intelligence is, isn’t ‘what it is to us’, but simpler
  6. Possibly far simpler (we might imagine that for every new kind of intelligence that we compare, the smaller the common intersect between all, until we reach some minimal set, the phenomenal signature of all intelligence, which necessarily corresponds with the term as we use it)

—does such a set exist?

—do we presently use the term ‘intelligence’ correctly?

5/

relative general-domain

—what came before x, and how do we think of x in those terms?

—what are the evolutionary origins of biological intelligence?

  • Neuronal intelligence
  • Cellular intelligence
  • Pre-cellular intelligence?
  • —what before then?
  • —is all biological form intelligent?
  • —is non-biological matter intelligent?

—must we define each layer before moving on?

—if each layer is a unique scope or problem-space, requiring intrinsic definition, is there some way to simplify scopes (or problem-spaces) pre-definition, by extrinsic relation?

If we tried to define neuronal or non-neuronal intelligence now, without first identifying the way in which each relates, we in-effect contrive framing of each definition of intelligence around each kinds’ relative distinctions.

Relative distinction is special-domain; to understand what is common across different kinds of intelligence, we must see past relative distinction of special-domains, to respective/ relative general-domain.

  1. A single phenomenon has a respective general-domain (‘what more is different from’, and what it took to get there; or phenomenal {compositional; temporal} substrate)
  2. Plural phenomena share a relative general-domain (what is common about what ‘more is different from’, and what it took to get there; or common phenomenal {compositional; temporal} substrate)

Set-theoretic consideration shows us that :

  1. (Typically), the complexity of commonality (intersect) decreases as the diversity of scopes (sets of elements) increase
  2. Each general-domain is simpler than relative special-domains (because special-domains include respective general-domains)
  3. The relative general-domain between plural diverse special-domains is simpler than each, and contains no special-domain distinction; however, all special-domain distinction will derive from it’s elements in some manner
  4. Understanding the relative general-domain between plural diverse kinds of intelligence will set the frame for defining intelligence of all kinds

6/

representational substrate

a derived form of phenomenal substrate, which directly instructs human intelligence

#tbc
  1. Map territory: whether right, wrong, useful, correct or neither – a map is always (and can only ever be) one of a finite-set-of-possible structural compositions, of respective representational substrate, all the way down, through map and territory

7/

results

—what came before x, and how do we think of x in prior terms?

  1. Biological evolution
  2. Biological behaviour
  3. Biology
  4. Cells
  5. Neurones
  6. Neuronal intelligence

for brevity, fundamental priors relate to :

  1. conditional (finite) potential: any conversation about universal phenomena is necessarily predicated upon change (/the potential for change); universal change is conditional, conditions equate to finiteness of universal potential, and of incrementally discreet universal change

  2. phenomenal alignment, to intersection: there is something that it is for phenomenal characteristics to equate, align, and collide

  3. evaluation upon intersection: there is something that it is for sufficiently intersecting phenomena to influence one another in a way which resembles the evaluation of characteristics (across all sufficiently intersecting parties)

  4. finite legal form: there is something that it is for some intersection to satisfy plural thresholds of sufficiency, which results in the apparent coordination of change across parties, such that ongoing change becomes harmonised to a stable equilibrium, of effective causal state; and something that it is for intersection to not satisfy respective thresholds of sufficiency; and so legal universal forms are finite, and all respective phenomenal behaviour {construction; composition; participation; discontinuation} is conditional

see: on causal scope

—what came before x, and how do we think of x in prior terms?

  1. Biological evolution
    1. Material structural or compositional change
    2. Structural/ compositional change, which prevents the discontinuation of individuals by circumstances behind trends in the discontinuation of populations 3
  2. Biological replication
    1. Catalyst: a material causal constructor (conditional: dependant upon extrinsic circumstances); cyclical/ continuable: completion of construction cycle returns catalyst to origin state; persistent causal system (a system is a conditional sequencer)
    2. Replicator: a material causal (construction) sequencer (conditional: dependant upon extrinsic circumstances, typically cell intrinsic); cyclical/ continuable: completion of replication cycle returns replicator to origin state; persistent causal system (a system is a conditional sequencer)
  3. Biological behaviour
    1. Stimulus organism response: conditional response
  4. Cells
    1. Encapsulation: conditional intrinsic circumstances
  5. Neurones
    1. Physical adaptation: physical conditionality; conditionality (operationally valid physical arrangement) must be physically constructed substrate (within the constraints of matter); finite legal forms of variation, with arbitrarily different set-of-possible construction, compositional, and material constraints/ dependencies per type of matter, in-place (not all types and compositions play well together)
    2. Informational adaptation: configurable conditionality; homogeneous substrate simplifies construction to non-volatile type with arbitrarily complex structural compositional form (evolution no longer fights incompatible molecules, etc)
    3. Fixed autonomy: pre-configured conditionality; generational evolutionary lifecycle (of configuration)
    4. Adaptive autonomy: dynamically configurable conditionality; momentary evolutionary lifecycle (of configuration)
  6. Neuronal intelligence

#tbc more coming…

appendix

the substrate of scientific endeavour

‘sentimentropy’

think of the substrate of isolated scientific endeavours

any special-domain which is not framed by relative general-domain, is too-special: we have failed to correctly describe phenomenal distinction ‘in-place’; and we have not yet reconciled and validated the perceived details of phenomenal distinctions by relative commonality, and the innate inherited constraints of territory

there is a free-lunch to be had here, paid for by innate universal order – when we sentimentally cling to familiar ‘useful but not correct’ order – we artificially preserve ‘sentimentropy’

  1. Like lazy-loading/ lazy-construction ↩︎

  2. Tactical/ scaffolding ↩︎

  3. Evolution (process) describes intrinsic change relative to extrinsic circumstances; evolution (state) describes the relationship between (the result of) intrinsic change, and the profile of ongoing extrinsic circumstance ↩︎