A response to points raised in an email from Charlie Munford @.

charlie

Thanks for sending your piece “On Cognition and Computation!” (on cognition and computation)

Here are a few thoughts, fwiw. Just musing, feel free to interpret however you like.

section 1

  1. I think of all communication, including computation, as metaphorical, because it is only a metaphor that can connect two umwelts together.
  2. Two organisms have to have some common sort of experience in their respective umwelts for something to be transmitted between them that counts as semantically meaningful.
  3. Otherwise, they affect each other and change each other but you wouldn’t really describe it as communication.
  4. Computation (really mathematics) is an attempt to create a universal language of generic entities and forces that can translate something from one umwelt to another, but the impact is still dependent on decrypting the metaphor.
  5. Ultimately it means turning it into gene expression.
  6. The metaphor is a metaphor.
  7. The “thing” is a metaphor.
  8. The element of the metaphor and the element of the “thing” that coincide is a metaphor within two metaphors

section 2

  1. I think of conditionality as only a small part of what neurons are up to.
  2. I think the abbreviated, sudden change we see that resembles a binary on/off logic gate is only a result of the complex elaboration of a more continuous process until it has become efficient.
  3. I think the real purpose of neuronal activity is timing.
  4. Brains are centers of coordination between moving parts, not centers of command.
  5. A conditional firing is only part of an oscillation, and the oscillations are what matter.
  6. Each cell is creating its own rhythm, and also coordinating its rhythm with the rest of the body, and all of those rhythms serve environmental rhythms as slaves to masters, and also serving new rhythms that are discovered in the umwelt through learning.

I love this essay so much; maybe you’ve already read it?: On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.

themanual4am

Thanks Charlie, this is great.

Firstly, apologies for the delay. ‘Life chaos’ aside, several active conversations (including this one) appear to be converging around interesting new analysis, which is taking me a minute to reconcile. For the time being, I thought that I would get back to you with a partial response, which mostly rests on a distinction between abstraction and metaphor (separated to an appendix: #well-formed abstraction)

I’ve assumed that your above points/ ideas are a direct solicitation for synchronisation and feedback! (and I offer this response in the same spirit!)

“we routinely speak past each other, using different words for the same things, and the same words for different things”

– (from earlier in this project, directed at the species generally)

I think that there are several cases where we use different terms to refer to the same phenomena (or perhaps different aspects of the same phenomena). To establish a foundation to reconcile terms and ideas (and translate between), i’ll suggest relative differences between our perspectives, and define my usage a little.

General themes pivot around :

section 1 response

see: #section 1

1.1

“1. I think of all communication, including computation, as metaphorical, because it is only a metaphor that can connect two umwelts together” – Charlie

Q: —does your use of ‘metaphor’ generally equate to abstraction?

I use the term metaphor to refer to a specific subset of abstraction, such that while all metaphors are abstractions, not all abstractions are metaphors 1. Specifically: I consider a metaphor as ‘a well-formed abstraction’, and that; not all abstractions are well-formed.

—what does ‘well-formed abstraction’ mean?

See appendix: #well-formed abstraction.

Q: —what does connect mean here?

I’ve assumed some degree of sufficiently equivalent similarity? I have more questions, but most pivot on your interpretation of my definition of metaphor/ #well-formed abstraction.

1.2

“2. Two organisms have to have some common sort of experience in their respective umwelts for something to be transmitted between them that counts as semantically meaningful” – Charlie

(I suggest) between any two kinds of organism (and respective umwelts) there is always some commonality (assuming the same or fundamentally-equivalent universe)

Recently i’ve experimenting with the notion of ‘phenomenal substrate’ (substrate as an extension to medium), to better reflect plural layers of inherited characteristics which contribute to derived/ descendant phenomena. The substrate of cognition includes matter, so the substrate of all known umwelt includes physical phenomena (and descendants thereof); and so the set-of-all things common across umwelts necessarily includes inherited constraints from a common physical stack. How does this fit with your understanding?

Q: —how do we define semantically meaningful?

Meaning must be framed in terms of an organisms survival, of the environment and others (and respective phenomenal constraints); and evolution (by natural means) – iterative phenomenal structural change which prevents discontinuation, by the environment and others.

my questions : —what has meaning, and what does it mean to have meaning? —is semantic meaning a measure of interpretive process, resultant state, or subsequent enaction?

related: autonomy

1.3

“3. Otherwise, they affect each other and change each other but you wouldn’t really describe it as communication” – Charlie

Q: —how do we define communication?

#tbc i think this question touches on intent? or a technical description?

related: language

1.4

“4. Computation (really mathematics) is an attempt to create a universal language of generic entities and forces that can translate something from one umwelt to another, but the impact is still dependent on decrypting the metaphor” – Charlie

I certainly agree that ‘however universal a language, it must be decoded, and interpreted’: every abstraction (/map) is inherently ambiguous.

related: minimal-viable distinction

I consider mathematics (distinct from arithmetic) as both map and territory – we certainly didn’t create the territory of mathematics, nor the degree of alignment possible between that territory, and respective (minimal-viable aspectual) representation.

Sure, we created the (arbitrary) encoding to synchronise ‘our maps of the territory of mathematics’ between ourselves (sometimes): but mathematics is not interesting and useful because of our encoding; mathematics is interesting and useful because, what it is that we encode can under the right circumstances align with (our measurements of) territory with extraordinary accuracy.

To put it another way, what it is of mathematics which we encode via our languages and symbols, must represent fundamental {constraints; structures; behaviours} of our universe in a way which we cannot take any credit for creating.

1.5

“5. Ultimately it means turning it into gene expression” – Charlie

—what came before x, and how do we think of x in those terms?

Genes are part of the physical stack; and as such, significance is stack dependent. I’m interested to know how you frame ‘what genes do’ in prior terms (which propagate that stack)?

I’d like to dive into gene expression separately, as I think that this will help me better synchronise with both yours and Nate’s perspectives.

1.6, 1.7, 1.8

“6. The metaphor is a metaphor” “7. The ’thing’ is a metaphor.” “8. The element of the metaphor and the element of the “thing” that coincide is a metaphor within two metaphors” – Charlie

I’m pretty certain that metaphor here refers to both abstraction and metaphor :

  1. The metaphor is an abstraction
  2. The thing (as a map of territory) is an abstraction

The intersect between ’the abstraction initially referred to as a metaphor’ and ’the abstraction referred to as the thing’, is both an abstraction, and in this case, a metaphor (so well-formed)

actualmetaphormetaphormetaphorthingthingnot the actual metaphorcommon subset of concernsmetaphorthingset-of-all concernsset-of-all concerns

All phenomena, including abstractions, are composed, composable: so abstraction + abstraction = abstraction; etc.

$$\ldots$$

I think we’re getting warmed up :).

section 2 response

see: #section 2

2.1

“1. I think of conditionality as only a small part of what neurons are up to” – Charlie

All behaviour is circumstantially evaluated, so conditional on sufficient intersection of relative intrinsic and extrinsic circumstances. I think the notion of ’evaluation of conditions’ applies to pretty much everything, so (i suggest) conditionality is necessarily a part of everything neurones do :).

What else do neurones do?

Certainly, the non-trivial part of neurone activity includes self-assembly; operation, and; homeostasis; etc

Consider these draft examples :

  1. Think of the electrical wiring in a basic house, and imagine that the wiring self-assembled, and self-repaired. This kind of wiring would be significantly more complex; though relative to that newly complex implementation, what it is that the electrical system does externally (when perceived by external boundary), is far simpler conditional behaviour
  2. We often hear the number of neuronal connections of the human mind described as intractable or incomparable complexity – almost as a device to suppress rational thought. Neuronal connections make explicit the structural relationship of a kind of electro-chemical causal force. If we imagine the number of molecules in a femur, and the way their relative relation transmit/ constrain and direct physical forces across all scales and dimensions of incidence, might we find an equal number of circumstantially defined causal force bearing structures? Also, across the entire musculoskeletal system? (Note: this is a prototype argument, and needs revising)

Perhaps another way of framing this might be: —how might we map the circumstances of neurones between substrate and representational logistics/ conditionality?

2.2

“2. I think the abbreviated, sudden change we see that resembles a binary on/off logic gate is only a result of the complex elaboration of a more continuous process until it has become efficient”

The evaluation of conditions includes arbitrarily dimensional composed conditions. Conditions are gradients (or probabilities), all the way down. Survival pressures result in optimisations for minimal-viable constructional and operational cost.

2.3

“3. I think the real purpose of neuronal activity is timing” – Charlie

The significance of timing is a condition! :).

And yes, the time perspective is totally valid.

Though the time perspective doesn’t negate a physical perspective: time depends upon physical mutation; mutation sequence is time. I think getting into it, the real interesting frame is what came before – the prior space-of-all potential for state/ mutation/ time.

2.4

“4. Brains are centers of coordination between moving parts, not centers of command” – Charlie

I’m not sure these two are mutually exclusive? —how are you defining command?

2.5

“5. A conditional firing is only part of an oscillation, and the oscillations are what matter” – Charlie

—define oscillation?

The definition of an oscillation is a condition ;).

This seems to be part of your timing ‘metaphor set’. I have questions, but will perhaps read your paper first?

2.6

“6. Each cell is creating its own rhythm, and also coordinating its rhythm with the rest of the body, and all of those rhythms serve environmental rhythms as slaves to masters, and also serving new rhythms that are discovered in the umwelt through learning” – Charlie

Cool, I like expressive gists like this as they capture higher-level perspectives on insights, which despite being less detail explicit, are nonetheless useful framing sketches to both iterate from, and synchronise with others.

Though i’m not sure about “serving new rhythms that are discovered in the umwelt through learning”, but rhythm certainly fits my understanding of phenomenal cycles.

I think most biological processed can be thought of as some part of arbitrarily-plural intersecting cyclical processes (or continueable causal sequences: where continuation is the cycle), for which I suggest :

  • A catalyst is a one physical kind (a repeatable artefact producer see: on machines)
  • Extended by replicators {rna; dna} (plural step artefact composition – step segmentation)
  • Extended by proteins (?)/ etc (plural sequence artefact composition – sequence segmentation)
  • Etc

musing, i recently came across spinors , and suspect the ‘seemingly incremental nature’ of matter construction and mutation, to result from some kind of continuable/ cyclical fundamental, like this, propagating up through the stack

appendix

well-formed abstraction

—what is a well-formed abstraction?

Moved here: on well-formed abstractions.

stack analysis

#todo

  1. The metaphor subset is subject to increased constraints on membership; the space-of-all metaphor is smaller than the space-of-all abstraction ↩︎