on well-formed abstractions  ^{[active draft]  #tbc}

Metaphor is ‘well-formed abstraction’, and not all abstraction is well-formed.

Consider metaphor refers to a specific subset of abstraction, such that while all metaphors are abstractions, not all abstractions are metaphors.

the metaphor subset of abstraction is subject to increased constraints on membership: the space-of-all metaphor is smaller than the space-of-all abstraction

Consider that, what we commonly call a metaphor, is often another special-domain instance of the metaphor – and that what we mean when we use a metaphor, is always the bits which are common between, and never the bits which are uncommon between.

special-domain instances are in-effect, the accessible reference/ entry-point to an underlying metaphor

#fig: metaphor

special domains

special-domain refers to some finite subset of the space-of-all map (and-or respective territory)

for example: concept; context; paradigm; scientific-discipline; understanding; topic; speciality; profession; etc. (map, and-or respective territory)

In possibly (?) every special-domain :

1. There is something that it is for an abstraction to not be well-formed
2. There is something that it is for abstract forms to be iteratively refined, through a kind of partial restructuring (to be partially well-formed), whereby some internal dimension is remapped in such a way that the external conceptual boundary (or extrinsic interface) remains effectively unchanged
3. There is something that it is for characteristics of some of these partial-reformations to resemble the characteristics of partial-reformations of other arbitrarily different universal phenomena – as if taken from a special universally common set of (composed, composable) phenomenal characteristic/signature forms, which represent fragments of truth about our universe in a way arbitrarily composed abstractions do not
   1. (And, when an abstraction sufficiently equates to one of the universally common set, it is well-formed/ metaphor; and when an abstraction is composed from sufficient well-formed fragments, it is circumstantially-sufficiently well-formed/ metaphor)
4. And recognising that there is something that it is that ‘we don’t really understand a phenomenon until we have found the right metaphor to describe it’ (implicit, that the metaphor better fits some nature of the phenomenon that less-well-formed abstractions) – it is not unreasonable to consider that to restructure our understandings around the universally common set, is to reconcile and validate our maps of territory, by some kind of universal ‘rule book’ (of finite natural phenomenal compositional {constraint; structure; behaviour} forms),
   1. And if so, when our understandings are composed in a way which sufficiently complies with this universal ‘rule book’: our phenomenal reference frame becomes universal; all maps become related by universally common measures; universally-relative-objectivity
5. There is something that it would be that, as the number of special-domain phenomena which match each of the universally common set increases, so does the evidence for the universality of each (and the set), to describe universal phenomena, and to define/ suggest/ predict in some manner the space-of-all-possible future states of ongoing phenomenal composition
   1. And that this situations describes fundamental essence of truth/ universal consilience – the convergence or concordance of evidence) – of:-
      1. The applicability of a universally common set of fundamental forms
      2. And in the inverse, the correctness of our understanding, for all maps which sufficiently comply/ conform
6. There is something that it is for abstractions to be well-formed – equivalent to, or composed from, a universally common set of phenomenal relative-characteristic signatures – metaphors

metaphor and territory

#tbc

relativity

metaphor as the composition and language of relativity

#tbc a first-principles account

staging

abstraction to metaphor

It’s ok for our first-pass at understanding phenomena to be not well-formed. Transformation of abstractions – from not-well-formed, to well-formed – is commonly iterative, and staged.

for software, staging includes {prototype; beta; pr-release; release/ production; versioned} etc

A first-pass at understanding some new phenomenon often defines an external boundary, which includes {illuminating; interrogating; enumerating} all of the ways a phenomena behaves (participates causally). Often this kind of understanding is enough for us to use, to control, and predict outcomes, to shape or influence.

Abstractions, even not-well-formed abstractions, can be useful.

We don’t always need to know the inner working of a thing to use it’s extrinsic characteristics. At present, {illuminating; interrogating; enumerating} phenomenal intrinsics is a difficult process.

To develop intuitions on conceptual staging, let us consider analogues in other domains.

note that if this pattern exists in plural arbitrarily-different domains – map and territory – then by implication, there exists a universally common metaphor for staging the evaluation and refinement of not-well-formed phenomena to well-formed phenomena

intuition

analogues in other domains: an analogue is another special-domain implementation

1. Re-implementing a garden shed prototype by idealised/ tested/ safe/ etc ‘mass-producible’ parts
2. Refactoring a big ball of mud to clean-code, based upon standardised common design patterns;

both cases illuminate the extrinsic boundary of an idea (or special-domain) ¹, but are yet to be intrinsically recomposed from the optimised intermediate forms of a well-formed general-domain (or phenomenal substrate)

At this first stage, both of these domains map directly to: ’not “really” understanding something until appropriate metaphors have been found’;

physical invention

the garden shed prototype

A physical ‘garden-shed’ prototype demonstrating a capability, before being re-implemented for compatability with mass-production by a factory production line.

software

reworking ideas – software’s “big ball of mud” prototype

Software code repositories are like a live-document. Software explicitly allows (and at times encourages) staged progression towards ideal state. This separates validating the premise of an idea from eventual well-formed implementation.

Clean (well-formed) code takes effort and time; so (for non-trivial projects) when the value in development objective is yet to be proven, software encourages ‘minimal-viable product’ (or prototype) to prove the premise of objective in some circumstantially appropriate manner (for example problem-solution fit demonstrates that a problem has been solved, in principle)

After this, the software can be re-engineered for production/ release substrate (device performance, infrastructure scale, etc) – this is really no different to a physical ‘garden-shed’ prototype demonstrating a capability, before being re-implemented for compatability with mass-production by a factory production line, for example.

intractability

#rewrite

Some inventions/ products/ concepts are ‘ahead of their time’, in that we can demonstrate a prototype/ premise/ external boundary, but lack the means to progress implementation to release form.

• We lack the knowledge to cleanly re-implement the redundant complexity of a prototype to an optimal form
• Once we identify and solve that separate problem, we then re-implement the prototype around its ‘conceptual/ practical essence’

isolated conceptual domains

#rewrite

Isolated understandings have no obvious fundamental relation with.

• This kind of understanding is commonly perceived as a conceptually intractable problem-space, which includes non-trivial behavioural edge-cases which cannot be resolved without a deeper understanding (of intrinsic composition, and respective characteristics)
• The inability to restructure abstract understandings to metaphor is, at times, a sign that the abstraction emphasises (/ or is shaped around) the wrong set of constituent phenomena, because the primitive constituents of an abstraction instruct it’s structural and behaviour profile, and therefore external boundary

the evolution of cognition by metaphor

srsly, how tf?

For an idea of how evolution might relatively easily stumble-upon cognition by metaphor – the universal common set, see de-duplication.