a follow-up to io - charlie - metaphor

Great… this is fun! – Charlie (Charlie Munford @)

Yes it is! –i’m enjoying this process!

intro

Overall, yes I can accept your definition of metaphor as a subset of all arbitrarily produced abstractions…the abstractions that say something important or useful for minds aiming to understand the world. But I think I disagree that there is anything universal about such truths, simply because I think minds are almost infinitely diverse, all the way down to true minds in single cells (and there are single-celled organisms, gut microbiota, in our minds). You wrote in note #1 that all cognition is abstract, so I think we are in full agreement – Charlie

Ok, regarding ‘metaphor as a well-formed subset of abstraction’, great!

I’ll push-back on other points a little, to interrogate differences in our perspective – so please push back also! (and related, if any article of yours specifically relates to any of my questions, please advise)

on universal truths

metaphors and puzzle-space

Given we agree that metaphor is a subset of abstraction (map), and map represents territory: metaphor (map) must represent the result of some aspect of territory which manifests (or facilitates) structural/ behavioural sameness, across arbitrarily different phenomena (territory)

Either we :

  1. Think that this phenomenon is just random, or a coincidence, or;
  2. We see clues to universal constraints on the validity of structural forms (and therefore finiteness/ puzzle-space)
    1. —why might this happen?
    2. —how might this happen?

Consider: metaphors are clues to universally consistent constraints on phenomenal relation and consequently finiteness of valid phenomenal structural and behavioural form.

—if that were true, what might expect to observe?

I suppose we might expect to find structural (relational) similarities across all {scales; levels; scopes; structural/ behavioural forms} of universal phenomena, and we do.

“metaphors are clues to universally consistent constraints on phenomenal {relation; structure; behaviour}, and consequently the finiteness of valid phenomenal form – metaphors are clues to a universal puzzle-space”

on infinite diversity

—what does ‘infinite diversity’ mean here?

I interpret ‘infinite diversity’ as unrelated/ unrelatable/ unconstrained diversity – is that correct?

Though I think that all phenomenal diversity – can only be – fractional-delta to phenomenal commonality.

—how might I communicate intuition for this? I think ‘commonality-diversity relationship’ ought to be visualised as dimensions of variation relative to common phenomenal form (whether present or prior)

  1. So fractional-pockets of difference distributed throughout an {composition; constituent; organism; organ; etc}. So for example, the difference between two trees, or individuals within a species, is a minor blur on overall commonality

For a more formal intuition, consider that when we focus on the common subset, we are (in-effect) mapping or charting the major branches of a fractal, while (temporarily) ignoring minor branches – which is crucial – as it frames the boundary which constrains all relative minor branches. Without this, when we focus on relative distinction (minor branches) without boundary constraints, we’re unable to notice when we ‘colour over the lines’, which in-effect, misattributes phenomenal characteristics to the wrong phenomena.

another conversation perhaps?

although it is a fundamental premise – generally, this all fits within a notion of correcting the mistakes of isolated scientific disciplines, with a universally common approach to ‘fractional phenomenal accounting’

—why is it we (collectively!) so often feel the need to invent completely new explanations for almost any phenomena, before reconciling what we know/ suspect must apply in some manner, to minimise the space-of-all things we need a new explanation for?

note: this isn’t a comment about the way we name explanations, but how we compose them

1.2

1.2. I think meaning is specifically not framed in terms of an organism’s survival, that’s the cornerstone of my theory of life (epistolution.) I think instead all phenotypes carry memories and representations of the world inside them that define entities and forces that explain their worlds. When these representations conflict with experience, those conflicts are meaningful and problematic.  They demand and motivate further investigation, interaction, experimentation, interpretation, and learning. I think this process of meaning-building (epistolution) is the reason organisms stay organized, not because of the influence of heritable material. Self-organization must be caused by the way a phenotype interacts with the umwelt; heritable material cannot deploy, edit, replicate, suppress, or express itself.  – Charlie

I agree, the entire space of sense-making is super important to untangle!

on umwelt
  1. —is umwelt intractable? (like an encapsulated, decoupled, impenetrable thing?)
  2. —how might we visualise umwelt diversity?
  3. —in what way is an umwelt constrained by it’s biological substrate?
  4. —in what way are common characteristics of co-existing biological systems (musculoskeletal/ cardiovascular/ architectural segmentation/ etc), reflected in umwelt?
on meaning

Meaning might refer to :

  1. Interpreting and evaluating causal alignment (the contextual scene, map implicates territory);
  2. Our assessed measure of relative significance;
  3. Situational/ occasional/ circumstantial operational motivation;
  4. Or other downstream situations/ occasions/ circumstances, etc (i describe the relation here: autonomy)

on meaning, i feel that (above) you might be pointing toward the significance of things, but i also think the evaluation of significance is a consequence of biological infrastructure evolved for survival… so perhaps we need to further define: memories; representations of the world; entities and forces that explain the world

for notes, see: autonomy

—does this align with your understanding?

on material composition

—is the phenotype not influenced by heritable material (genotype), and stack thereof?

Consider an organisms phenotype as an environmental or circumstantial space-of-all-possible outcomes :

  1. This space is finite; and constrained by material constraints of priors (genotype) and peers (genotype and environment) – this includes all respective stacks see below note
  2. Such that, both genotype and phenotype are the substrate/ composition of an organism
  3. Whatever an organism does, begins with and is therefore constrained by, the phenomenal characteristics of heritable material

note: my perspective includes phenomenal stack-analysis, to align and account for phenomenally inherited characteristics, by which i refer to: phenomena as composition, which inherit structural/ behavioural characteristics from constituents; this includes all downstream operational forms (through genotype, phenotype, map, operation, cognition, experience, artefacts, etc)

  1. —so, where does this diverge from your perspective?
  2. —is your position an explicit push-back against “it’s all genotype” or some such?

1.3

1.3. Good question! Maybe only through well-formed metaphors :) – Charlie

lots to say, but a separate conversation! see: language, on scientific technical debt for now

1.4

1.4. I’m not sure. When you frame the question this way I think I’m inclined to agree with Kant that math is just an expression of the structure of our own brains and our habitual ways of thinking, but I could be convinced otherwise. I think something is real if it plays an important role in our best theories of reality. Right now math does do this, but it hasn’t always and perhaps there is something deeper we will discover one day.  I think of all tech, including math, in the Heideggerian way as a sort of reframing of reality. In other words, I think reality is probably infinitely reinterpretable in better ways (truth infinitely approachable but never finally apprehended -Popper)  – Charlie

on mathematics
  1. Starting with kant: so, what i’m saying includes kants above premise, but with crucial additional framing – our brains work the way they do, because the fabric of cognition is territory, and so follows the same universally consistent phenomenal/ compositional constraints, which govern structural relation and respective behaviour
    1. Metaphor is fundamental to cognition, because the substrate of cognition must necessarily comply with the same fundamental constraints on phenomenal characteristics responsible for the phenomenon of {relation; structure; behaviour; form} sameness across arbitrarily different universal phenomena
  2. Mathematics is just formal, composable, evaluable, abstraction: not all mathematics is equivalently concise, just as not all abstraction is equivalently well-formed (and not all well-formed abstractions equivalent); (and any measure of quality must also consider contextual suitability)
  3. Yes agree, we can only abstract isolated aspects of territory: we cannot model all aspects of territory simultaneously, anymore than we can perceive all perspectives of a single physical object simultaneously
  4. Yes agree, all abstraction reframes reality, the only problem with this is when we forget our abstractions ought to join up cleanly, like different perspectives of the same physical object

“metaphor is fundamental to cognition, because the substrate of cognition must necessarily comply with the same fundamental constraints on phenomenal characteristics responsible for the phenomenon of {relation; structure; behaviour; form} sameness across arbitrarily different universal phenomena”

2.1

2.1. If a guitar string is plucked, it vibrates harmonically based on the length of the string and the resonator because each molecule of bronze and steel transmits something as a consequence of its participation in a whole system. Are these molecules evaluating conditions? If so I agree that neurons do that. – Charlie

on causal evaluation
  1. Causal evaluation occurs whenever phenomena intersect sufficiently
  2. Causal evaluation of sufficiently intersecting phenomena (in space-time) includes both: compositionally intrinsic (ongoing) intersection; extrinsic (occasional/ incidental) intersection
  3. On occasion, the result of extrinsic (incidental) intersection, is a stable ongoing relationship – relative phenomenal structure, or phenomenal composition; evaluation continues, as ongoing (intrinsic) evaluation, with the result of a new extrinsic behavioural profile – that is to say the possible result of future extrinsic (incidental) intersection, and evaluation changes (aka more is different)
on vibrating strings
  1. Not all structures are valid
  2. If atoms in the string are separated by too much distance, the structure/ string will break
  3. Every single structural change must be in-effect evaluated for ongoing compliance with universal constraints (this includes all relevant environmental circumstances, etc)

note: the potential for evaluation upon intersection must necessarily exist within (or along with) the most primitive universal phenomena (or i suppose, by some manner of universal causal machinery, akin to a processor running a simulation), such that the causal behaviour of all derived forms of phenomena result from this same fundamental evaluation ‘percolating up’ through the conditional behavioural profiles of every descent/ derived scope of phenomenal composition

2.2

2.2. There are no such thing as survival pressures. Natural selection only removes phenotypes and lineages; it doesn’t shape the ones that are left behind. So we have to imagine some other force or forces that created the “optimisation for minimum-viable construction and optimisation cost.” I propose that it was the urge to understand the world (epistolution) – Charlie

on survival pressures

By survival pressures I primarily mean the biological imperative which fundamentally drives biological continuation – to survive to reproduction.

This includes the usual headlines of ’the need to interpret and act, to survive our environment and others, now and in the future’ (with alignment sketched here: autonomy)

Breaking this down, we have :

  1. Composition: efficient physical construction and maintenance
  2. Cognition: sufficiently accurate interpretation
  3. Operation: efficient enaction, weighing all action against resources/ reserves, and risk

All biological processes optimise towards minimum-viability of the {construction; operation; maintenance; etc} of form, because :

  1. Minimal-viable structures (and respective behaviours) are more likely to evolve in the first place
  2. Ongoing {growth; operation; maintenance} with the least cost {time; resource} introduces the least risk

Natural selection in-effect, reduces the set-of-all active (or current) structural forms, and doesn’t need to shape individual forms, to shape the set-of-all active forms.

Individual forms are shaped by the circumstances of evaluation upon intersection, whereby sufficient intersection results in new phenomenal relationship (and therefore composition); noting that every incremental result must necessarily fall within a finite space-of-all possible valid incremental mutations. Circumstances shape individual forms, but only with finite tolerances, which result from the behavioural profile of participatory phenomena, and inherited characteristics of respective constituents (implied structural relationships), all the way down.