io - nate - lackoff

very interesting, thank you Nate

only a quick scan, but very relatable, in various ways

due to limited time, these notes will appear more abrupt than i intend – I don’t mean to pick on lackoff here – initially, I point-out and align differences between takes, explicitly

(philosophy books often seem like i’m being forced to decide between straw-men?)

background

on defining ‘sets’

i’m not sure what ’limitations of sets’ are meant to be

i assume that we ought to make a distinction between sets and set-theoretic sets?

• otherwise we fail to recognise the place of set-theory in mathematics: set-theory can represent all forms of mathematics

geometry, graph, and set

conceptual cognition uses (at least) geometric, graph, and set-theoretic-ish sets:

• I place graph in the middle because
  • 1. neurones are associated graph
  • 2. we can formally translate between geometry and graph, and graph and set
• simplifying (!), the different use-cases relate to:
  • geometric – sensory alignment with external phenomena, distinction (territory)
    • like SOR entry-points, if you will
  • graph – relation, implementation all
  • set – epistemological/ ontological alignment, commonality (map)

¹

1. consider the implementation of sets as flattened perspective of a graph
   1. so when i talk about composition and composed constituents (which are themselves composition, all the way down), hold in mind the pattern, and you might begin to perceive a tree, down through phenomenal complexity, and back in time
   2. hold that thought, and consider de-duplication
2. sets as we implement them, are not constrained in the manner lackoff suggests, and in-fact
   1. encompass ‘imaginative’ cognition
   2. and operationally reduce to symbol manipulation just fine (though lackoff conflates the experience-of operations?)

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alignment and reasoning

@tm4am: “we identify by distinction, reason by commonality”

commonality here is:

• the decomposed graph, described in de-duplication
• a precursor to reasoning (cannot reason insufficiently-associated fragments)

reasoning is:

• arbitrarily contextual simulation (/evaluation) of this graph
• an operation, which is dependent upon minimal
  • 1. persisted state
  • 2. associations
• so, not just the graph, nor just operations, but experience-of, inclusive

this is pertinent because:

• reasoning itself requires embodied state (for relative assessment; async feedback of significance, etc)
• fragments of formal state in-isolation may ‘represent effectively objectively’
  • though it depends upon the scope of definition, decoding, etc

important note: i suggest all cognition is necessarily relative in practice, as objective representational contexts are commonly evaluated against our embodied (/homeostatic) and body-relative-environmental (/allostatic) sensory contexts, to form meaning, evaluate significance ²

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lackoff: note summary

given the above:

• it appears as though lackoff is suggesting that old = flattened sets; new = graph?

  • ok

• “this means that they are independent of bodily nature”

  • can argue this for ‘state at rest, in isolation’
    • though experience, process and state are relative

• lackoff still suggests “the we use imaginative mechanisms are central to how we construct categories to make sense”

  • this is backwards (and implies human incomparability with other species)

• interesting point: it seems as though lackoff uses prototype as I might a general-case phenomenal composition?

  • as such, where special case is delta from general-case = prototype plus variation (which typically relate or implicate specific contextual variation) (like general terms relative to jargon, which relates or implicates domain specific context)

• objectivist

  • objectivism seems to be anne rand’s thing (with questionably related context, re morality, etc)
  • noting that i describe minimal viable, present and sufficient symbol manipulation mechanism for metaphor etc, in de-duplication, much of the rest of the set-up to define objectivist seems straw-man / misleading/ false

• point list

  • #tbc

• “in-fact so common that many of the are often assumed to be true without question or comment”

  • ding ding ding gender-neutral bernard boner! :D

• “things are in the same category if the have the same things in common”

  • compositions are perceived as being in the same category if they share common constituents; are derived-from/ share common phenomenal ancestors

• points:

  • lackoff’s framing implicates categories exist because ‘we smart’, rather than a simple side-effect of ‘representational minification/ compression’ via separation of concerns
  • “it is this imaginative capacity that allows for abstract thought”
    • eh? all map {state; process; reification/ experience} – can only be – abstract
      • inherently decoupled/ distinct from pertinent territory (which includes interpreted physical characteristics of territory)
    • pre-neuronal conditionality (threshold chemical trigger) was physical decoupling, and abstracted unconditional response to triggering circumstances
      • origin may even be ‘shittier/ less sensitive implementation’!
  • “though has gestalt properties”
    • conflation
      • {state; process; experience}
        • the experience of assessing significance of any concept in-and-across plural contexts, including async response of embodied state, conceptually, contextually interpreted as emotion, has ‘gestalt properties’, mode is different after all, but gestalt is in the delta ³
    • “thought is thus more than just the mechanical manipulation of abstract symbols”
      • ‘just’ is carrying much straw here

• so far, lackoff seems to conflate

  • experience and operation, as if mutually exclusive
  • sensory/ objective representation
  • representational distinction, and commonality

#tbc

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response 1

$$\ldots$$

Interesting reaction. A few thoughts from me:

Lakoff isn’t critiquing set theory, just observing that the mind doesn’t only categorize things by simple inclusion / exclusion criteria. There’s also a process of fuzzy pattern matching (prototype theory, imagination) that complements it.

I’m surprised you see Lakoff as a human exceptionalist. Except for his points about science and society, I thought his observations applied to all species.

Lakoff’s “objectivism” and Rand’s are not the same thing, they just have the same name. Lakoff’s point is our ontology is subjective and constrained by our embodied perspective.

You seem quick to mark ideas from prominent thinkers as incompatible with your philosophy. I’d encourage you to see them as partly right, or right from some perspective instead. That way, you’ll have more allies than enemies, and can borrow ideas from credible sources to lend support to your arguments (even if you vehemently disagree with them on other points).

$$\ldots$$

Yes, overall you’re right, of course

An overly defensive posture, perhaps? I think your initial intro: ‘he rejects the set-like model’, and; ‘see some of the limits of set-like approaches and what kind of thinking you can can’t do with them’, etc; lead me to focus on an (interpreted) implied equivalence. I ought to have asked for clarification, if nothing else. A good lesson

Yes, conditional matching includes {intensity; tolerance; threshold; gradient; count; degree; etc} which encompasses fuzzy matching. I suggest that tuning of these kinds of variations is implemented by ‘deferred opportunistic learning’ – aka arriving thoughts (or ‘matters for attention’), which are queued during quieter moments (based upon simple rules, which are predictive and can be shaped/ influenced)

Ok, re (the intentional collision and redefinition of) objectivism – I guess I wasn’t sure that was a thing with the ‘pros’. Good to know. I’ll revisit.

Hmm, the first paragraph here points out the nature of my focus due to time limitations, but to be clear (and to combine the comment on straw-men) – from my perspective, I absolutely agree with points from both – such that it seems as though these established professionals (here: lackoff and ’nemesis’) are taking snippets of truth (without the obvious grounding), and bundling obscure falsehoods (which i know isn’t the case).

I hope I’m not making enemies by objective critique – I thought that is what scientific (and philosophical) discourse was about? But I’ll happily address any points you think need to be qualified. I suppose I found pointing-out delta more ‘definite’ within time constraints (which otherwise might demand more nuanced prose than available to me). But another good lesson

the exceptionalist comment

“I’m surprised you see Lakoff as a human exceptionalist”

an implicit theme perhaps (albeit only over the preface and chapter 1!)

I’ll source quotes here (there are 45 references to human, and i feel like there’s still a statement I’ve missed when circling back!):

• “Why does all this matter? It matters for our understanding of who we are as human beings and for all that follows from that understanding. The capacity to reason is usually taken as defining what human beings are and as distinguishing us from other things that are alive. If we understand reason as being disembodied, then our bodies are only incidental to what we are. If we understand reason as mechanical-the sort of thing a computer can do–then we will devalue human intelligence as computers get more efficient”
  • ‘reason defining and distinguishing us from other things that are alive’, and;
  • talk of fear of ‘devaluing what makes us special’
• “If we understand rationality as the capacity to mirror the world external to human beings, then we will devalue those aspects of the mind that can do infinitely more than that. If we understand reason as merely literal, we will devalue art. How we understand the mind matters in all these ways and more. It matters for what we value in ourselves and others-for education, for research, for the way we set up human institutions, and most important for what counts as a humane way to live and act.”
  • only humans are humane, sure… and only humans butcher like we do, and will willingly sit by and watch (with intent and influence) ours and many other species burn and die
  • at this time, while any of us stands by and does nothing for each of the present and looming crises, as long as we are just comfortable enough, the ‘humanity’ of the species is a myth; some individuals sure, and thank fuck. i’m not blaming people. shits tough right now, especially. but we don’t get ourselves out of this mess with fairy-tales, nor back-patting
• “It is important that we have discovered that rational thought goes well beyond the literal and the mechanical”
  • define literal and mechanical, cause it’s abstraction and mechanics of some kind
  • mechanisms and blueprints include conditionality, and tolerance, and the rest
  • engineers see this, right? – contextually defined tolerances is what engineering is about. musing: is it a ‘science-thing’ to see mechanisms and blueprints as some kind of dynamic-(complex-system!)-context-averse fragility? is that the argument?
• “What is most interesting to me about these studies is that they seem to provide evidence for the experientialist view of human reason and against the objectivist view. Taken one by one, such studies are things only scholars could care about, but taken as a whole, they have something magnificent about them: evidence that the mind is more than a mere mirror of nature or a processor of symbols, that it is not incidental to the mind that we have bodies, and that the capacity for understanding and meaningful thought goes beyond what any machine can do”
  • the first part sets the scene for lack of nuance, with ’this v that’, no? there are elements of each which align with this project, surely stances are against aspects of the objectivist view, etc?
    • i think i’m just an uncultured sci-philo-noob nate. i’ll get there.
  • clamouring and clinging to ‘beyond what any machine can do’…
    • just a bit desperate, no?
    • or does he mean can do right now? a differently desperate point, perhaps?