on phenomenal substrate  ^{[active draft]  #tbc}

A map is not the territory it represents, nor is a map the territory it represents upon – the respective maps’ representational substrate; and although, typically, the utility and accuracy of every map is measured by degree of alignment with the former – the territory it represents – a map is most fundamentally constrained by the nature and granular composition of the latter – its respective representational substrate; because above all, whether right or wrong, useful, correct or neither – a map is always (and can only ever be) one of a finite-set-of-possible structural compositions, of respective representational substrate, all the way down.

substrate

Consider each individually discernible universal phenomenon as a unique ‘special-domain’; and that each unique special-domain exists relative to a general-domain (see: on scientific technical debt), which includes respective constituents (reductionism plus more-is-different, plus participatory extrinsic circumstances) and priors (phenomenal/ evolutionary priors, plus extrinsic contributory circumstances)

Thinking of universal phenomena as relative difference, helps avoid contriving the redundant complexity of absolute distinction (of isolated, intractable or irreducible forms, or worse of unknown anomaly) ¹.

Consider each phenomenon’s respective ‘relative general-domain’ as a ‘phenomenal substrate’, which constitutes one of a finite-set-of-possible variations of generally equivalent implementations.

Thinking of universal phenomena as implemented by common substrate, helps frame phenomenal distinction ‘in-place’ (compositionally and temporally); and as such, in high-dimensional concordance with fundamental constraints of territory – universal composition through time.

think of the phenomenal substrate of a cathedral (or whatever!) :

• arches, pillars, walls, roof/ ceilings, etc
• blocks and bricks, timber, metalwork, glass
• also incidental substrate, like scaffolding – no longer visible, but essential to construction

think of the substrate of isolated scientific endeavours

any special-domain which is not framed by relative general-domain, is too-special: we have failed to correctly describe phenomenal distinction ‘in-place’; and we have not yet reconciled and validated the perceived details of phenomenal distinctions by the innate constraints of territory

there is a free-lunch to be had here, paid for by innate universal order – yet we sentimentally cling to familiar ‘useful but not correct’ order – we cling to sentimentropy

#rewrite

staging

useful but not correct is fine, as long as we remember each is a distinct special-domain, with equally distinct respective general-domain, or substrate; and as such, we ought not demand correct be framed in terms of useful. the general-domain, or substrate, is necessarily different

Useful is totally fine for first pass.

It is OK if the first result of mapping phenomenal territory is some intractable or irreducible form, in the same way it is OK that the formal-lifecycle of {software; physical invention; writing; art; etc} all explicitly include initial-prototype forms – proof-of-concepts – useful but not correct examples ².

What science forgets of some scientific explanations (at times), is that to get from useful but not correct prototype to some production worthy implementation, we might need to almost entirely reimagine the conceptually-proven-useful-thing, within the fundamental constraints of a ‘production worthy substrate’ – a process dependant upon reduction, and recomposition – and at times elimination of substrate-incompatible detail or complexity from the original form (writings: kill your darlings)

There is something that it is for :

1. A map to conform with both the territory it represents, and the territory of it’s respective substrate
2. For the essence of {software; physical invention; writing; art; etc} to conform with both the intended purpose and respective production substrate

to think of phenomena in terms of constituents and priors, illuminates the phenomenal substrate constraints which instruct finite legal form ³

When it comes to thinking about scientific/ conceptual mapping of territory, any inability to reimagine ideas in terms of priors/ substrate, is a good sign that key elements of the idea are contrived and redundant ⁴.

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OK, examples please!

—what came before x, and how do we think of x in prior terms?

1. Biological evolution
2. Biological behaviour
3. Biology
4. Cells
5. Neurones
6. Neuronal intelligence

for brevity, fundamental priors relate to :

1. conditional (finite) potential: any conversation about universal phenomena is necessarily predicated upon change (/the potential for change); universal change is conditional, conditions equate to finiteness of universal potential, and of incrementally discreet universal change

2. phenomenal alignment, to intersection: there is something that is for phenomenal characteristics to equate, align, and collide

3. evaluation upon intersection: there is something that it is for sufficiently intersecting phenomena to influence one another in a way which resembles the evaluation of characteristics (across all sufficiently intersecting parties)

4. finite legal form: there is something that it is for some intersection to satisfy plural thresholds of sufficiency, which results in the apparent coordination of change across parties, such that ongoing change becomes harmonised to a stable equilibrium, of effective causal state; and something that it is for intersection to not satisfy respective thresholds of sufficiency; and so legal universal forms are finite, and all respective phenomenal behaviour {construction; composition; participation; discontinuation} is conditional

see: on causal scope

1. Biological evolution
   1. Material structural or compositional change
   2. Structural/ compositional change, which prevents the discontinuation of individuals by circumstances behind trends in the discontinuation of populations ⁵
2. Biological replication
   1. Catalyst: a material causal constructor (conditional: dependant upon extrinsic circumstances); cyclical/ continuable: completion of construction cycle returns catalyst to origin state; persistent causal system (a system is a conditional sequencer)
   2. Replicator: a material causal (construction) sequencer (conditional: dependant upon extrinsic circumstances, typically cell intrinsic); cyclical/ continuable: completion of replication cycle returns replicator to origin state; persistent causal system (a system is a conditional sequencer)
3. Biological behaviour
   1. Stimulus organism response: conditional response
4. Cells
   1. Encapsulation: conditional intrinsic circumstances
5. Neurones
   1. Physical adaptation: physical conditionality; conditionality (operationally valid physical arrangement) must be physically constructed substrate (within the constraints of matter); finite legal forms of variation, with arbitrarily different set-of-possible construction, compositional, and material constraints/ dependencies per type of matter, in-place (not all types and compositions play well together)
   2. Informational adaptation: configurable conditionality; homogeneous substrate simplifies construction to non-volatile type with arbitrarily complex structural compositional form (evolution no longer fights incompatible molecules, etc)
   3. Fixed autonomy: pre-configured conditionality; generational evolutionary lifecycle (of configuration)
   4. Adaptive autonomy: dynamically configurable conditionality; momentary evolutionary lifecycle (of configuration)
6. Neuronal intelligence

#tbc more coming…