Hello Nate!
Ok, firstly, thank you. I appreciate this conversation tremendously!
- The de-duplication question first: #de-duplication
- Then address some of the referred concepts: #synchronising terms and concepts
de-duplication
Regarding my question about “de-duplication”, as relates to “new ideas”
i’ve sketched out some context:
synchronising terms and concepts
“a catch-up synchronisation of terms and concepts based on your posts so far”
mechanics
- An abstract mathematical account of change, cause and effect
causality/ causation
- Note: I dislike up/ down causation and levels as both are one-dimensional; I prefer casual participation/ peers, and participatory scope, for reasons
the gap
- This project began with identifying phenomena unrepresented by present science (observable and testable conditional cognitive mechanics). If it were true, scientific understanding must have a substantial gap in understanding
- Nicoles description of this “gap in representation” is very useful framing, and validation
representation (https://tech.lgbt/@ngaylinn/111143329735552185)
- Is discussed throughout this project
- Material abstraction map lifecycle
- Further: representation has two flavours: distinction and relation (commonality)
- We identify by minimal-viable distinction; we reason by commonality
- Distinction is minimal-viable representational delta 1
- Commonality will be discussed
map territory
- All map {representation; knowledge; comprehension; cognition; etc} is abstract; ambiguous
- Consider, perspective as operational map
- “No intelligence has direct access to the world”
- Yes agree
- “Fundamentally basic” validation of detected stimuli is critical to align map with territory
- And early patterns for this are instructive to general cognition
- And the present state of our understanding of the mind (and cognition)
emergence
- I fundamentally dislike the term “emergence”. Naming things is hard, but “mechanisms result”. Anything else, is a failure of imagination/ formality/ temporary/ misleading
- We’re all pointing at the same observables, but describe them differently. Territory aligns, maps ought to. Territory evaluates prior state, which conditionally results within a “finite space of possible”, delta; and conditionally, new state
translating across domains
“looking at the same observables from two totally different ontological perspectives”
- I say we are able to translate across domains (and is ok, necessary and instructive), as long as we address “double counting” or “plural enumeration”, by reconciling commonality
- “Fractional accounting”, de-duplication, to constrains our maps; and can be used to interrogate anomaly, and domain transformation
- It’s ok
- To think of approximately all universal phenomena in non-exclusive terms – 1) distinct object/thing; 2) system; 3) subset; 4) context (peer or superset) – because territory is continuous, and maps aren’t, and as such, are arbitrarily scoped
- It is necessary
- To reframe objects (as systems, subsets, peers, supersets, etc)
- To establish a fractional account, of constituents (recursively, as necessary)
- To relate and reconcile map with territory
- To relate and reconcile across maps (or perspectives)
- It is precisely because some “more is different” results in very different side-effects – by transformations which originate a new perceptive domain – that to make sense of any origin transformation (or perceptive domains) we must reconcile by fractional accounts
- It is instructive
- – Consider that as compositional complexity accrues through “levels/ scopes”, characteristics of prior primitive forms (including patterns of behaviour) reappear (say catalyst, transformer, etc)
- Eg. Consider isomorphisms between catalyst, transformer and organism
- A transformer isomorphism is (i think) sufficient for ‘perceived projection’ of causation into differently perceivable, interpretable domains
ai
- Present approaches to ai do not de-duplicate in the way I refer here (deep conceptual contextual de-duplication, if you will). There is no conceptual, contextual interpretation. Present approaches to ai are “all plural enumeration”
free will
- (It hasn’t come up, but explicitly) yes, free-will exists in a mechanical account of cognition
- Which can describe:
- “Where free-will happens” in operational, architectural terms
- That free-will is not the same for all
- It is a matter of available conditionality (of response or action in any moment), which is part circumstantial, part accrued experience, part operational proficiency (weighted by historical circumstances and experience)
- This is easier to express formally, operationally